Western A New Approach to Risk Assessment

Slobodan P. Simonovic

The University of Western Ontario The Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction





Introduction





Simonovic



Outline

- Uncertainty and risk
 - Objective risk
 - Subjective risk
- A new methodology
 - Fuzzy set approach
- Examples
 - Water supply risk
 - Flood disaster risk
- Conclusions





Uncertainty

- Current context
 - The dangers are more difficult to understand
 - Technical, social, economic and environmental systems are becoming increasingly complex
 - Information is shared much more rapidly
- Consequences
 - Larger damage
 - Instead of gradual and local damage much more widespread loss accumulation
 - Need for more active dialogue among stakeholders





Uncertainty

- Uncertainty lack of certainty
- Implication is risk
 - Significant potential unwelcome effects of system performance
 - Knowledge of potential losses
- Risk reduction
 - Understanding the nature of the underlying threats in order to identify, assess and manage the risk
 - Understanding the value systems that define the risk perception





Uncertainty taxonomy



Simonovic

Western

Sep 21, 2007

6



Risk dilemma

- Three fundamental types of risk
 - Objective the property of real physical systems
 - Subjective the degree of belief in a statement (not the property of real system)
 - Perceived an individual's feeling of fear in the face of an undesirable possible event
- This is perhaps the most important misconception that blocks the way toward more effective societal risk management
- The ways society manages risks appear to be dominated by considerations of perceived and subjective risks, while it is objective risks that kill people, damage the environment and create property loss.





Research context

- The main objective is development of the possible methodology for the reliability analysis of water resources systems that will be capable of:
 - (a) addressing water resources uncertainty caused by variability and ambiguity;
 - (b) integrating objective and subjective risk; and
 - (c) assisting the water resources management based on better understanding of temporal and spatial variability of risk.









System performance indices

$$P_{\rm s} = P(\widehat{X} > \widehat{Y})$$

 $P_{F} = P(\widehat{X} < \widehat{Y})$

probability of satisfactory performance

Sep 21, 2007

probability of failure

$$\widehat{\mathbf{M}} = \widehat{\mathbf{X}} - \widehat{\mathbf{Y}}$$

margin of safety

factor of safety

$$\widehat{\Theta} = \frac{\widehat{X}}{\widehat{Y}}$$



Simonovic



Fuzzy sets

A fuzzy set is one which assigns grades of membership *between 0* and *1* to objects within its universe of discourse. If *X* is a universal set whose elements are $\{x\}$, then, a fuzzy set A is defined by, its membership function,

 $\mu_A: X \rightarrow [0,1]$

which assigns to every x a degree of membership in the interval [0, 1].

$$A = \{(x, \mu_A(x))\}, \quad x \in X$$





New definition of failure

Friday Forum











Simonovic



System state

$$\widetilde{S}(D) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } D \leq D_{Min} \\ \frac{D - D_{Min}}{D_{Mean} - D_{Min}} & \text{if } D \in [D_{Min}, D_{Mean}] \\ \frac{D_{Max} - D}{D_{Max} - D_{Mean}} & \text{if } D \in [D_{Mean}, D_{Max}] \\ 0 & \text{if } D \geq D_{Max} \end{cases}$$

Acceptable level of performance

$$\widetilde{M}(D) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } D \leq D_1 \\ \theta(D) & \text{if } D \in [D_1, D_2] \\ 0 & \text{if } D \geq D_2 \end{cases}$$



Simonovic

The compatibility measure

$$CM_{S,L} = \frac{WOA_{S,L}}{WA_S}$$

- provides information about system reliability and vulnerability
- measure of proximity (overlap)



 $\begin{aligned} \text{Reliability Index} = & \frac{\max_{i \in K} \left\{ \text{CM}_1, \text{CM}_2, \dots, \text{CM}_i \right\} \times \text{LR}_{\max}}{\max_{i \in K} \left\{ \text{LR}_1, \text{LR}_2, \dots, \text{LR}_i \right\}} \end{aligned}$

Robustness Index =
$$\frac{1}{CM_1 - CM_2}$$

Resilience Index =
$$\begin{bmatrix} \int_{t_1}^{t_2} t \ \widetilde{T}(t) \ dt \\ \int_{t_1}^{t_2} \widetilde{T}(t) \ dt \end{bmatrix}^{-1}$$



Simonovic



Implementation example 1













	Microsoft Excel - Case Study-	Calculation(LH)).xls						_ 8 ×	
	😰 Eile Edit View Insert Format Iools Data Window Help Type a question for help 🔹 _ 🗗 🗙									
Arial • 16 • B / U 三 三 三 国 \$ % , 18 +19 使 使 _ • 办 • ▲ • •										
A4 - fx										
9	A	В	н	1	J	ĸ	L.	M	N T	
4		1 10	Units	Capacity			Requirment			
5		System		Average Daily flow	Design Capacity	Maximum Overload	Yearly Min	Yearly Avg	Yearly Max	
6 7 8	Intake Crib Chlorinator I RC Intake Pipe	Intak e Syste m	MLD Kg/d MLD	157.3 360.0 157.3	340.0 630.0 340.0	454.6 900.0 454.6	53.0 24.5 53.0	157.3 72.0 157.3	255.7 130.0 255.7	
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Traveling Screens Pumping Wells Chlorinator II Single Speed Pump 1 Variable Speed Pump 2 Single Speed Pump 1 (Back-up Variable Speed Pump 2 (Back-up Variable Speed Pump 2 (Back-up	Low Lifting System	MLD MLD Kg/d MLD MLD MLD MLD MLD	157.3 157.3 360.0 49.9 57.4 49.9 49.9 57.4 49.9	340.0 340.0 630.0 75.0 86.2 75.0 75.0 86.2 75.0	454.8 454.6 900.0 110.0 115.0 100.0 100.0 115.0 100.0	53.0 53.0 24.5 16.8 19.3 16.8 16.8 19.3 16.8	157.3 157.3 72.0 49.0 49.0 49.0 49.0 49.0 49.0	255.7 255.7 130.0 81.2 93.4 81.2 93.4 81.2 93.4 81.2 93.4 81.2	

AC	AD	AE	AF	AG	AH	Al	AJ	AK	AL	AM.	AN	AO	AP
Element-State (Tri-MoS)			Element-State (Trap-MoS)			Element-Failure (Tri)			Element-Failure (Trap)			э <i>р</i>)	
а	Þ	e	ð	4	G	ď	а	b	c	8	ð	¢	d
-0.22	0.40	0.88	-0.22	0.09	0.41	0.88	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.17
0.26	0.62	0.97	0.26	0.44	0.74	0.97	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
-0.22	0.40	0.88	-0.22	0.09	0.41	0.88	0.08	0.13	0.17	0.08	0.11	0.14	0.17
-0.22	0.40	0.88	-0.22	0.09	0.41	0.88	0.04	0.08	0.50	0.04	0.19	0.35	0.50
-0.22	0.40	0.88	-0.22	0.09	0.41	0.88	0.00	0.50	1.00	0.00	0.33	0.67	1.00
0.26	0.62	0.97	0.26	0.44	0.74	0.97	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
-0.31	0.26	0.83	-0.31	-0.03	0.22	0.83	0.02	2.51	5.00	0.02	1.68	3.34	5.00
-0.31	0.32	0.83	-0.31	0.01	0.32	0.83	0.02	2.51	5.00	0.02	1.68	3.34	5.00
-0.31	0.26	0.83	-0.31	-0.03	0.22	0.83	0.02	2.51	5.00	0.02	1.68	3.34	5.00
-0.31	0.26	0.83	-0.31	-0.03	0.22	0.83	0.02	2.51	5.00	0.02	1.68	3,34	5.00
-0.31	0.32	0.83	-0.31	0.01	0.32	0.83	0.02	2.51	5.00	0.02	1.68	3.34	5.00
-0.31	0.26	0.83	-0.31	-0.03	0.22	0.83	0.02	2.51	5.00	0.02	1.68	3.34	5.00
	AC <i>Elemen</i> <i>a</i> -0.22 0.26 -0.22 -0.22 0.26 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31	AC AD Element-State (1	AC AD AE Element-State (Tri-MOS) c c 0.22 0.40 0.83 0.26 0.62 0.31 0.22 0.40 0.88 -0.22 0.40 0.88 -0.22 0.40 0.88 -0.22 0.40 0.88 -0.22 0.40 0.88 -0.22 0.40 0.88 -0.21 0.40 0.88 -0.22 0.40 0.88 -0.23 0.40 0.88 -0.24 0.40 0.88 -0.25 0.40 0.88 -0.26 0.63 0.31 -0.31 0.26 0.83 -0.31 0.26 0.83 -0.31 0.32 0.83 -0.31 0.26 0.83 -0.31 0.26 0.83	AC AD AE AF Element-State (Tri-MoS) Elem a b c a b c a a a c b c a a c b c a a c b c a a c b c a a c b c a a c b c a a c b c a a c b c a a c c c a a c c c a a c c a a a c a a a a c a a a a c a a a a a a <td< th=""><th>AC AD AE AF AG Element-State (Tri-MoS) Element-State a b c a b a b c a b c a b c a b c a b a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b a c a b a</th><th>AC AD AE AF AG AH Element-State (Tri-MoS) Element-State (Trap-II AG AH 0 A C B A C</th><th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AI Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) s A c s A c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d d c d d c d</th><th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element 0 <</th><th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ AK Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failur a b c a b c d a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b</th><th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AJ AJ AK AL Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) a b c a b c a b c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a a c a a c a</th><th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AJ AJ AK AL AM Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) a A c a A c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a<th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ AK AL AM AN Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trip-MOS) Element-State (Trip-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) a A c a c a c a c a c a c a c a a c a a c a a c a<!--</th--><th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AJ AJ AK AL AM AN AO Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) a b c b c d d c d d d d d d d d d d d</th></th></th></td<>	AC AD AE AF AG Element-State (Tri-MoS) Element-State a b c a b a b c a b c a b c a b c a b a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b a c a b a	AC AD AE AF AG AH Element-State (Tri-MoS) Element-State (Trap-II AG AH 0 A C B A C	AC AD AE AF AG AH AI Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) s A c s A c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d c d d c d d c d	AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element 0 <	AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ AK Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failur a b c a b c d a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c a b	AC AD AE AF AG AH AJ AJ AK AL Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) a b c a b c a b c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a a c a a c a	AC AD AE AF AG AH AJ AJ AK AL AM Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) a A c a A c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a c a <th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ AK AL AM AN Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trip-MOS) Element-State (Trip-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) a A c a c a c a c a c a c a c a a c a a c a a c a<!--</th--><th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AJ AJ AK AL AM AN AO Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) a b c b c d d c d d d d d d d d d d d</th></th>	AC AD AE AF AG AH AI AJ AK AL AM AN Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trip-MOS) Element-State (Trip-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) a A c a c a c a c a c a c a c a a c a a c a a c a </th <th>AC AD AE AF AG AH AJ AJ AK AL AM AN AO Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) a b c b c d d c d d d d d d d d d d d</th>	AC AD AE AF AG AH AJ AJ AK AL AM AN AO Element-State (Tri-MOS) Element-State (Trap-MOS) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) Element-Failure (Tri) a b c b c d d c d d d d d d d d d d d



Simonovic







Simonovic









	LHF	PWSS	EAPWSS		
Fuzzy Performance Index	Triangular	Trapezoidal	Triangular	Trapezoidal	
Combined Reliability-Vulnerability	0.699	0.642	0.042	0.017	
Robustness (level 2 – level 1)	NA	NA	1.347	3.314	
Robustness (level 3 – level 1)	-2.120	-2.473	NA	NA	
Robustness (level 3 – level 2)	-2.120	-2.473	-1.347	-3.314	
Resiliency	0.017	0.017	0.054	0.054	





Implementation example 2

- Extension of fuzzy risk analysis to spatial problems
- Integration of GIS and fuzzy risk analysis
- Medway Creek Flooding– North London





Medway Creek flooding case study





Simonovic



Medway Creek flooding case study





Simonovic



Instead of conclusions

- One possible methodology for risk analysis capable of:
 - addressing uncertainty caused by variability and ambiguity;
 - integrating objective and subjective risk; and
 - assisting in risk management based on better understanding of temporal and spatial variability of risk.





Instead of conclusions

- Fuzzy risk analysis provides for addressing uncertainty caused by variability and ambiguity.
- Risk is described using a combined fuzzy reliability and vulnerability, fuzzy robustness and fuzzy resiliency.
- Fuzzy risk analysis has been successfully extended into a spatial fuzzy risk analysis.





Research

- Over 10 years (postdoctoral fellows, PhD and MSc cadidates)
- Support:
 - National Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC)
 - Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEP)
 - ICLR
- Resource:

www.slobodansimonovic.com

